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Abstract: In two early papers, Max Cresswell constructed two formal lo-
gics of propositional identity,  and , which he observed to be re-
spectively deductively equivalent to modal logics 4 and 5. Cresswell
argued informally that these equivalences respectively “give . . . evidence”
for the correctness of 4 and 5 as logics of broadly logical necessity. In
this paper, I describe weaker propositional identity logics than  that
accommodate core intuitions about identity and I argue that Cresswell’s
informal arguments do not firmly and without epistemic circularity jus-
tify accepting 4 or 5. I also describe how to formulate standard modal
logics (, 2, and their extensions) with strict equivalence as the only
modal primitive.
1 T   
Cresswell [2, 3] constructs two formal logics of propositional identity,  and
, and informally argues for the correctness of 4 and 5 as logics of broadly
logical necessity on the grounds of their respective deductive equivalence to
 and . I will describe weaker propositional identity logics than  that
accommodate core intuitions about identity, and I will argue that Cresswell’s
informal arguments do not firmly and without epistemic circularity justify ac-
cepting 4 or 5. I myself will not argue for or against the correctness of 4 or
5.
∗A version of this paper was presented at the 2003 Northwest Philosophy Conference at
Reed College where I benefited from comments by Peter Hanks and further discussion with
Anthony Anderson and Mark Hinchliff. I also received helpful comments on various versions
and ancestors from Bernard Linsky, Peter Loptson, Ernest Sosa, Karen Wendling, and anonym-
ous readers.
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 is  + {, , 1, 2, 3}.1  is the classical non-modal propos-
itional calculus formulated with uniform substitution () and modus ponens
() as basic inference rules. > is an arbitrary -tautology. ‘=’ is a binary
modal operator and is the only modal primitive in . ‘α = β’ is read as ‘that
α is the very same proposition as that β’.2
() ` (p = q) ⊃ (α ⊃ β), provided that α differs from β only in having p in
some of the places where β has q.
() If ` (α ≡ β) then ` (α = β).
(1) 2α =df (α = >)
(2) (α↔ β) =df 2(α ≡ β)
(3) 3α =df ∼2∼α
 has theorems (, ) formally expressing the contentious metaphysical
view that () strict equivalence is propositional identity and logical necessity
is identity with a tautology.3
() (p = q) = (p↔ q)
() 2p = (p = >)
’s sole axiom, , is a principle of substitutivity (or indiscernibility) of
identical propositions and  has theorems (1–3) affirming the reflexivity,
symmetry, and transitivity of propositional identity.4
(1) p = p
(2) (p = q) ⊃ (q = p)
1I use “” and other names of logical systems with deliberate ambiguity. In one sense, for
example, “” names a logic, that is, a set of theses (axioms and theorems). In another sense,
“” names a particular basis or axiomatization of that logic, that is, a particular set of axioms,
basic inference rules, and definitions, whose closure is  (first sense). Context will generally
resolve this ambiguity but I will sometimes specify a sense explicitly.
2For my own convenience, I have altered Cresswell’s notation and some propositions’ names,
and added some definitions. I generally use ‘=’ as an operator (at Prior’s suggestion; see [16,
p. 190], for example) rather than as a relational predicate. I do sometimes use ‘=’ as a rela-
tional predicate in the meta-language or in first-order object-language expressions, but such
non-operator uses of ‘=’ are clear from context.
3“‘What are the conditions for propositional identity?’ . . . is a language-independent meta-
physical question whose answer demands an analysis . . . of the notion of a proposition” [5,
p. 45]. That strict equivalence is propositional identity and necessity is identity with a tautology
is implied by the views that (a) propositions are sets of worlds while (b) necessity is truth in all
possible worlds [5, pp. 24, 39].
4Proofs of formal results reported in this paper are not difficult and are left as exercises for
the reader.
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(3) ((p = q)∧ (q = r)) ⊃ (p = r)
Cresswell proves that  is deductively equivalent to 4 when the latter
is extended to formally express (). 4 is  + {k, t, 4, , 2, 3}. 4 is the
controversial characteristic thesis of 4. ‘2’ is the only modal primitive in this
formulation of 4.
(k) 2(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (2p ⊃ 2q)
(t) 2p ⊃ p
(4) 2p ⊃ 22p
() If ` α then ` 2α.
Cresswell proves that  is deductively equivalent to 4 + 4 [2, p. 192].
(4) (p = q) =df (p↔ q)
4 + 4 has as theorems , , , and 1–3. () is also well-expressed
by another extension of 4, that is, by 4 +  ′.
( ′) (p = q) ≡ (p↔ q)
Since substitution of proved material equivalents () is available even in ,
where  is 4 − {t, 4}, Cresswell’s proof with trivial modifications establishes
that  is deductively equivalent to 4 +  ′.
Appealing to the formal results he describes, Cresswell argues informally
for 4 as a logic of broadly logical necessity.
The interesting point about  however is that  is simply the
identity schema and  also seems to contain no reference to mod-
ality. The equivalence of  and 4 would seem to give further
evidence for the view . . . that where [‘2’] means, ‘It is informally
provable that’ then 4 is the system which captures its meaning [2,
p. 195].
In other words, Cresswell does not rest justification for 4 merely on variable
intuitions about controversial principles explicitly about necessity [6, p. 29];
[7, pp. 51–52]. Instead, he adopts metaphysical view () and then aims to rest
justification for 4 on what I will call core intuitions about identity, that is, on
intuitions about identity that are both uniformly firmer and more widespread
than intuitions explicitly about controversial elements of 4 or 5. Philosoph-
ers disagree about 4, for example, but no one doubts that identity is somehow
reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive or that identicals are somehow substitut-
able.
Cresswell comes later to think that there is a further firm intuition about
identity that  does not accommodate. So he extends  to  accord-
ingly.  is +. ⊥ is an arbitrary -contradiction.
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() ((p = q) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ((p = q) = ⊥)
Cresswell observes that  is deductively equivalent to 5 when the latter is
extended to formally express (). 5 is  + e, where  is 4 − 4.
(e) 3p ⊃ 23p
 is deductively equivalent to 5+4 and to 5+ ′. Since  is justified
as a logic of propositional identity and  is deductively equivalent to 5,
Cresswell informally argues, 5 is justified as a logic of broadly logical necessity
[3, p. 291].
 apparently is motivated by an intuition that all non-identities are neces-
sary. The principle that non-identical propositions are necessarily non-identical
perhaps is formalized more clearly by 4 than by .
(4) ∼(p = q) ⊃ 2∼(p = q)
4 is deductively equivalent to e and to  in both  + 4 and  +  ′, and
so in both 4 + 4 and 4 +  ′.5
2 J  
Intuitions about identity do bear on the acceptability of 4 and 5. However,
some intuitions have less epistemic potency than others and somemore readily
than others interact epistemically with broader philosophical considerations.
For one thing, relatively controversial principles about identity are not sup-
ported by core intuitions about identity but only by what I will call peripheral
intuitions about identity, that is, by intuitions that are either not uniformly
firmer or not more widespread than intuitions explicitly about controversial
elements of 4 or 5. For example, the principles that all identities and non-
identities are necessary are, like 4 and e, controversial principles explicitly
about necessity. So Cresswell’s informal argument for 5, which rests on the
intuitions behind , does not firmly and non-circularly justify acceptance of
5.
The inability of peripheral intuitions about identity to firmly justify con-
troversial principles about necessity is aggravated by the potential such intu-
itions have to be defeated by the epistemic force of an otherwise well-justified
metaphysical view.6 For example, not all identities and non-identities of in-
5By “α is deductively equivalent to β in S”, I mean “S+α is deductively equivalent to S+β”.
6Many metaphysicians take seriously views according to which identity is or is not relat-
ive, relevant, temporary, contingent, occasional, vague, or indeterminate in ways that variously
augment or undermine the justification for identity principles that otherwise are more or less
plausible intuitively. For representative discussions, see the references in notes 7 and 8, below.
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dividuals are necessary if counterpart theory is true.7 So, if counterpart the-
ory were otherwise well-justified, the peripheral intuitive support for the prin-
ciples that identities and non-identities are necessary might be defeated. The
general point applies also to propositional identity. For example, if any meta-
physical view were otherwise well-justified that implies both (a) theses of con-
tingent identity and diversity of individuals and (b) a thesis of wide content
(say, counterpart theory plus Russellian propositions), then the principles of
the necessity of propositional identity and diversity might be undermined. For
argument’s sake, represent the proposition that p, that you and I are identical,
as 〈you,me, x is identical with y〉 and represent the proposition that q, that
I am self-identical as 〈me,me, x is identical with y〉. That p is not the very
same proposition as that q, since they are wholes whose parts are not all
shared. However, in a world in which you and I have the same counterpart,
the propositions that p and that q also have the same counterpart. Say that
our counterpart in one such world is Bloggs. Represent the proposition that
r, which is the counterpart there of the propositions that p and that q, as
〈Bloggs, Bloggs, x is identical with y〉. That r is the very same proposition as
that r, so it is possible that that p is the very same proposition as that q.
So, apparently, diverse propositions are not necessarily diverse if such a meta-
physical view is true. Nor, by analogous reasoning, are identical propositions
necessarily identical.
Like peripheral intuitions, core intuitions about identity also interact epi-
stemically with broader philosophical considerations. Core intuitions do firmly
support the uncontroversial but vague principles that identity is somehow re-
flexive, symmetrical, and transitive and that identicals are somehow substitut-
able. However, each of these vague informal principles can be given alternat-
ive but nonequivalent formal expressions, none inheriting more apparent pre-
sumptive justification than the others from the intuitions behind their vague
parent. No choice of one formal expression rather than another of a vague in-
formal principle can be justified merely by the intuitions backing the informal
principle—broader philosophical considerations must be brought to bear.8
7x (this plastic) and y (this dishpan) are identical, but there is a world in which the coun-
terpart of x is a wastebasket and the counterpart of y is made of different plastic, so x and y
are not necessarily identical. You and I are non-identical, but there is a world in which we have
the same counterpart, so we are not necessarily non-identical. See Lewis [12, 13]. For related
discussions, see Kripke [10, 11], Marcus [14], and Noonan [15].
8Kremer notes that “the principle of symmetry has . . . non-equivalent forms”, that “With
transitivity, we have even more choices”, and that there are “various forms of indiscernibil-
ity and substitution” [9, pp. 200, 201]. He also usefully points out that the precise range of
alternatives available for expressing a given informal identity principle within a given formal
system depends on the formal resources available in the system. Perhaps it is not quite right,
though, to say (where ‘=’ is a relational predicate, not a modal operator) that “The only version
of reflexivity is () x = x” [9, p. 200]. Perhaps such formal principles as the necessity of
self-identity of individuals ([ ′] 2x = x) and the essentiality of self-identity of individuals
([ ′′] x exists ⊃ 2x = x, or [ ′′′]2(x exists ⊃ x = x)) may also be regarded as alternative
formal expressions of the principle that identity is reflexive.
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For example, in the formal vocabulary of standard modal predicate logic
(where ‘=’ is a relational predicate, not a modal operator), 2 and 2 ′ each
express the vague principle that identicals are somehow substitutable.
(2) x = y ⊃ (α ⊃ β), provided that α differs from β only in having free x in
some of the places where β has free y.
(2 ′) x = y ⊃ (α ⊃ β), provided that α differs from β only in having free x in
some of the places, not in the scope of any modal operator, where β has
free y.
However, 2 does while 2 ′ does not imply that all identities are necessary [6,
p. 195]; [7, p. 334]. So acceptance of 2 ′ rather than 2 may accommodate both
the intuitive precariousness of the principle that all identities are necessary
and the intuitive fundamentality of the principle that identicals are somehow
substitutable. Again, the general point applies also to propositional identity.
For example, , 5, and 6 each express the vague principle that identical
propositions are somehow substitutable.
(5) If ` (γ = δ) then ` (α ⊃ β), provided that α differs from β only in
having γ in some of the places where β has δ.
(6) ` (p = q) ⊃ (α ⊃ β), provided that α differs from β only in having p in
some of the places, not in the scope of any modal operator, where β has
q.
However, while  implies that (7) all propositional identities are necessary,
neither 5 nor 6 implies 7.
(7) (p = q) ⊃ 2(p = q)
So acceptance of either 5 or 6 rather than  may accommodate both
the intuitive precariousness of the principle that all propositional identities
are necessary and the intuitive fundamentality of the principle that identical
propositions are somehow substitutable.
So, if there are weaker propositional identity logics than  that accom-
modate core intuitions about identity, then a choice of one of those logics over
the others cannot be justified merely by those core intuitions and Cresswell’s
informal argument for 4 does not firmly and non-circularly justify acceptance
of 4.
3 N   
There are propositional identity logics that are weaker than  and in which
propositional identity is somehow reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, and
identical propositions are somehow substitutable.
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 is such a spartan basis for 4 that it is hard to see how to weaken
necessity in the system. Things are easier if one begins with a more usual
basis for 4, extended to express (). I will begin with 4 +  ′, which has
as theorems that necessity is both identical with and materially equivalent to
identity with a tautology (,  ′).
( ′) 2p ≡ (p = >)
The basis of 4 +  ′ is easily modified so propositional identity is the only
modal primitive. Let 4= be  + {k=, t=, 4=, =,  ′′, 1, 2, 3}.
(k=) ((p ⊃ q) = >) ⊃ ((p = >) ⊃ (q = >))
(t=) (p = >) ⊃ p
(4=) (p = >) ⊃ ((p = >) = >)
(=) If ` α then ` (α = >).
( ′′) (p = q) ≡ ((p ≡ q) = >)
The bases of 4 +  ′ and 4= share , 2, and 3. 4 +  ′ also has
the other elements of the basis of 4=, since k=, t=, 4=, =, and  ′′ are all
provable by  ′. And 4= has the other elements of the basis of 4+  ′, since
k, t, 4, , and  ′ are all provable by 1. So 4= is deductively equivalent to
4 +  ′ and so to .
4= is a less spartan basis than  for 4 and necessity in that less spartan
basis is easily weakened. Let = be 4= − 4. = is deductively equivalent to
 +  ′ and to  + 4. Both = and 4= are logics in which propositional
identity is the only modal primitive. But necessity in = (-necessity) is weaker
than necessity in 4= (4-necessity). A spectrum of propositional identity lo-
gics is constructible in an obvious way. Each system in the spectrum has pro-
positional identity as its only modal primitive, but necessity varies in strength
from system to system, from -necessity to 5-necessity. So, for example, let
= be = − t=, = be = + b=, and 5= be = + e=.9
9Each of , , , 4, and 5 (and their extensions) can be given bases with strict equivalence
as the only modal primitive (sep-bases), as follows. From the basis for the corresponding propos-
itional identity logic, delete both  ′′ and 2, replace 1 with 5, and uniformly replace ‘=’
throughout the basis with ‘↔’.
(5) 2α =df (α↔ >)
Any modal logic that has both  and  ′′ and that has a basis with necessity as the only modal
primitive (an np-basis) can also be given an sep-basis by deleting any pre-existing definition of
‘↔’ from the np-basis; then, for all α, uniformly replacing p2αq throughout the basis with
pα↔ >q; then adding 5.
( ′′) 2p ≡ (p↔ >)
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(b=) p ⊃ (∼(∼p = >) = >)
(e=) ∼(∼p = >) ⊃ (∼(∼p = >) = >)
Call a propositional identity logic normal if it can be formulated on a basis that
contains the basis just given for =.10 Every normal propositional identity lo-
gic has k=, is closed under , , and =, and has all the following: ,  ′,
,  ′,  ′′, 1, 2, 3, 5, . In other words, every normal proposi-
tional identity logic formally expresses metaphysical view (): strict equival-
ence is propositional identity (,  ′,  ′′, ), and necessity is identity with
a tautology (,  ′). And every normal modal propositional identity logic ac-
commodates core intuitions about identity: propositional identity is somehow
reflexive (1), symmetric (2), and transitive (3), and identical propositions
are somehow substitutable (5).
Differences between stronger and weaker normal propositional identity lo-
gics correspond to the presence or absence of specific theorems or rules about
propositional identity that are not imposed by core intuitions about identity.
= and = differ in having or lacking 6, which is deductively equivalent
to t in =. 6 says that identical propositions, whether or not their identity is
provable, are substitutable indiscernibly in non-modal (extensional) contexts.
This contrasts with 5, according to which provably identical propositions
are substitutable indiscernibly in all contexts in theorems. That is, 5 and 6
do not permit all the same substitutions. = has both 5 and 6, while =
The preceding method can be used to give sep-bases for  and its extensions. Huntington [8]
provides an sep-basis for 2. Though Hughes and Cresswell [6, p. 296] attribute 5 to him,
Huntington [8, p. 5] actually uses 6, where ‘*’ is a unary modal operator and ‘*α’ is read ‘it is
impossible that α’.
(6) *α =df (α↔ ⊥)
1 is given by Bronstein and Tarter [1, p. 307], who are mentioned by Hughes and Cresswell [6,
p. 297, note 334]. 1 easily suggests 5. In his formulation of 2, Huntington also uses 7.
(7) (α→ β) =df ∗(α∧ ∼β)
Huntington’s sep-basis for 2 can be modified in obvious ways to provide sep-bases for each of
2’s extensions (3, , etc.). For example, adding 3 as an axiom yields 3.
(3) (p→ q)→ (∗q→ ∗p)
10Call a propositional identity logic intensional if it has  ′. All normal propositional iden-
tity logics are intensional. If metaphysical view () is doubted, then—since  ′ is motivated
by ()—-non-intensional propositional identity logics likely will be of interest and the formal
distinction between ‘=’ and ‘↔’ will be significant. If () is not doubted, then  ′ may seem
trivial, the formal distinction between ‘=’ and ‘↔’ may seem otiose, and any standard modal
logic, normal or not, can be made to serve as a propositional identity logic simply be reading
‘α ↔ β’ in that logic as ‘that α is the very same proposition as that β’, i.e., by adding 4. If a
non-normal logic so serves, it is as a non-normal propositional identity logic.
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has only 5. So substitutivity (or indiscernibility) of identical propositions is
stronger in = than in =.
The difference between 4= and = has two aspects. On one hand, it is
the difference between the presence or absence of , which is deductively
equivalent to 4 in =.  says that identical propositions, whether or not
their identity is provable, are substitutable in all contexts. That is,  permits
substitutions that neither 5 nor 6 permits. 4= has , 5, and 6, so
substitutivity (or indiscernibility) of identical propositions is stronger in 4=
than in =. But the difference between = and 4= is also the difference
between the presence or absence of 7, a strong principle of the necessity of
propositional identity that is deductively equivalent to 4 and so to  in =.
= and = differ in having or lacking 8, which is deductively equivalent
to b in =.
(8) ∼(p ≡ q) ⊃ 2∼(p = q)
(b) p ⊃ 23p
8 is a weak principle of the necessity of propositional diversity, according to
which propositions differing in truth-value are necessarily diverse.
A stronger principle of the necessity of propositional diversity is 4, which
is deductively equivalent to e in =. So 5= and = differ in having or lacking
4.
4 C
Cresswell’s informal arguments show how modal logics 4 and 5 cohere with
metaphysical view (). However, those arguments do not firmly and without
epistemic circularity justify accepting 4 or 5, even conditional on the ac-
ceptability of (). Since a number of principles of propositional identity that
are crucial for the justification by Cresswell’s strategy even of the weaker 4
are also principles explicitly about necessity, it is difficult to see how a jus-
tifying argument for 4 or 5 might be constructed in which considerations
about propositional identity have clear epistemic priority over considerations
about broadly logical necessity. Since every normal propositional identity logic
both formally expresses () and accommodates core intuitions about identity,
it is difficult to see how intuitions about propositional identity alone, unaided
by broader philosophical considerations, might justify acceptance of a propos-
itional identity logic stronger than =; but there is anyway relatively little
doubt that strong and widespread intuitions about broadly logical necessity
alone tend to justify acceptance of a modal logic at least as strong as .11
11Hughes and Cresswell [6, pp. 25–30]; [7, pp. 51–52]. Even the intuitions of C. I. Lewis, whose
official system was the weaker 2, are said to point rather in the direction of  [4, p. 204].
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